The US Department of Homeland Security finished its first bioterrorism risk assessment in January 2006. That and the upcoming 2008 assessment employs a probabilistic risk assessment methodology designed to guide prioritization of ongoing biodefense-related research, development, planning and preparedness. The methodology and the scientific work it subsequently identifies as necessary have generated some discussion about both its design and consequence. This paper clarifies the current debate, describes the current processes in place, and identifies issues that merit further discussion.
School Authors: Christoph Bertram, Gokul Iyer
Other Authors: Isabela S. Tagomori, Fabio A. Diuana, Luiz Bernardo Baptista, Ioannis Dafnomilis, Laurent Drouet, Florian Fosse, Dimitris Fragkiadakis, Oliver Fricko, Elena Hooijschuur, Jarmo S. Kikstra, Volker Krey, Gunnar Luderer, Yang Ou, Lara Aleluia Reis, Oliver Richters, Pedro R. R. Rochedo, Zoi Vrontisi, Matthias Weitzel, Matthew Zwerling, Bas van Ruijven, Roberto Schaeffer, Detlef van Vuuren