Two decades of India’s Cold Start Doctrine

The overt nuclearization of South Asia has questioned the space for the use of force between India and Pakistan. However, India has introduced the contentious and yet ambiguous Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), designed to launch a limited war against Pakistan under the nuclear umbrella. This article examines the doctrine’s meaning and its core operational tool of Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs). It analyses the critical initiatives taken by the Indian government to overcome the main impediments that have hindered the operationalization of the CSD over the past two decades. These include: reorganizing the Indian Army Corps, improving rail and road infrastructure in border regions, enhancing the nighttime combat capabilities of mechanized units, increasing shoot-and-scoot strike capabilities, and strengthening real-time surveillance and communication systems. It finally argues that the CSD is likely to remain a fixture of the Indian military planning; however, its execution against Pakistan carries significant operational and strategic risks for regional peace and stability.