

Chapter 6

False Allegations of U.S. Biological Weapons Use during the Korean War

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The first charge that the United States had used biological weapons (BW) during the Korean War was made on May 8, 1951, by North Korea (the Democratic Republic of North Korea, or DPRK).¹ In a cable to the president of the United Nations Security Council, the DPRK's Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed that the United States had used BW between December 1950 and January 1951. In early 1952, the DPRK, China, and the USSR initiated a much larger campaign of BW allegations against the United States. U.S. government officials explicitly rejected the charges in absolute terms on repeated occasions. In fact, these biological warfare allegations were contrived and fraudulent, as documents obtained from former Soviet archives in January 1998 show, explicitly and in detail. Nevertheless, the propaganda campaign had wide international resonance at the time.

This chapter reviews the charges and then details the international response and its

shortcomings and missed opportunities to rebut the charges. It offers a retrospective assessment of the charges, and draws lessons of the case for future potentially false or fabricated allegations. It is important to understand who was responsible for conceiving and carrying out these fabricated charges: the USSR, China, or both? Because the charges were concocted, the book's framework of "identification, characterization, and attribution" is applied in a somewhat modified manner. Since putative "evidence" was planted and publicized internationally, the credibility of that "evidence" is examined. Given that the DPRK, China and the USSR refused to permit field investigation of the charges by any international body, the key question becomes: what might have been done at the time that could have more clearly rebutted the charges?

The Charges

The North Koreans charged in May 1951 that the United States had spread smallpox in North Korea.² Then, on February 22, 1952, Bak Hun Yung, North Korea's Foreign Minister, issued another official statement addressed to the UN Secretariat claiming that the United States had carried out air drops of infected insects of several kinds bearing plague, cholera, and other diseases over North Korean territory on two occasions in late January and on five days in mid-February 1952.³ Two days later, Zhou Enlai, the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC), publicly endorsed the North Korean charges. On March 8, Zhou Enlai enlarged the accusations against the United States,

charging that the United States had sent 448 aircraft on no fewer than 68 occasions between February 29 and March 5 into Northeast China to air-drop germ-carrying insects.⁴

As shown in a chronology in two Chinese government documents, on February 18, 1952, Marshal Nie Rongzhen, Head of the General Staff Department of the People's Liberation Army, had reported to the Military Affairs Committee (Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, and Lin Biao) that the United States was dropping flies, fleas, and spiders infected with bacteria (a claim he repeated on February 28).⁵ Mao replied to the first message: "Premier Zhou should pay more attention to it and handle it."⁶

The human diseases in the allegations were plague, anthrax, cholera, encephalitis, and a form of meningitis. The spread of animal and plant diseases was also alleged, including fowl septicemia and 11 incidents involving four different plant diseases. Eighteen different species of insects and arachnids (spiders and ticks), as well as some small rodents, were alleged to have been used as the disease vectors. Infected clams, paper and cloth packages, various kinds of earthenware, and metallic "leaflet bombs" — containers — were alleged to have been the dispersion media.⁷ It was winter in the area, and the insects and some other materials were reportedly found on top of the snow. China and North Korea both also claimed that the United States had carried out BW experiments on North Korean and Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) prisoners of war.

The Chinese and North Korean governments made use of three commissions to buttress

their allegations. The first was the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (hereafter referred to as the Lawyers' Commission).⁸ It sent a delegation to North Korea (March 5–19, 1952) immediately after the main BW accusations were made, and then to China (March 20–31). Its first report, issued in Beijing on March 31, claimed that the United States had used chemical weapons as well as bacterial weapons. Its second report, issued in Beijing on April 2, charged the United States with violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Genocide Convention of 1948. These reports — alleging twenty-two BW incidents — appear to have been intended as a formal war crimes indictment.⁹

The Chinese government's own investigating commission concluded with an even more explicit accusation of war crimes in a report issued April 7, 1952.¹⁰ This commission had only been organized a few weeks earlier, on March 15, 1952. It appears that this body gathered all of the evidence (materials and testimony) that was considered by the third group to investigate, the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China (ISC). The ISC was convened by the communist-oriented World Peace Council because, averred the Chinese representative to the World Peace Council, neither the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) nor the World Health Organization (WHO) were “sufficiently free from political influence to be capable of instituting an unbiased enquiry in the field.”¹¹

The ISC was chaired by Dr. Joseph Needham, a well-known British scientist who was also an avowed Marxist. Needham had headed the British Scientific Mission in China from 1942 to 1946, when he had served as an advisor to the Chinese Army (Kuomintang) Medical Administration, and had participated in an investigation of Japanese use of BW in China during World War II (discussed by Jeanne Guillemin in Chapter [8] in this volume).

The ISC was present in North Korea and China from June 23 to August 31, 1952. It published a massive 330,000 word, 669-page volume in Beijing in 1952, with extensive background information on entomology, vectors, pathogens, epidemiology, and so forth. All this information was prepared by and presented to the ISC by the Chinese commission. The ISC alleged fifty BW incidents, which were distinct from the 22 incidents reported by the Lawyers' Commission. By contrast, the Chinese media and the Chinese government reported over eleven hundred BW incidents.

The ISC report claimed that the United States had used organisms causing five human diseases: anthrax, plague, meningitis, cholera, and encephalitis (but not smallpox, which had been the first North Korean allegation in May 1951). It also alleged U.S. spread of an animal disease, fowl septicemia, along with eleven incidents of four different plant diseases involving soy beans and fruit trees. It claimed that the United States had used 18 species of arachnids as vectors, as well as infected clams, plant materials, and voles dying of plague. Among the alleged delivery systems were a World War II device of a type used

by the Japanese, a pottery container, and non-explosive metal containers used for massive leaflet drops from the air.

Chinese testimony to the ISC alleged many “anomalies”: in the location, the numbers, the seasons, or the combinations of insect species that were found. Chinese testimony reported by the ISC claimed that there had been no previous epidemics of disease X or Y, or no incidence of the disease at all in the area in question. However, the testimony reported few (in the tens) or no casualties at all, allegedly to avoid supplying intelligence to the United States.¹²

U.S. and International Response

The USSR pressed the Chinese and North Korean BW allegations against the United States at the United Nations in the General Assembly, in the Security Council, and in the UN Disarmament Commission. The U.S. and UN responses are examined here, including the denials made by U.S. and UN officials; the proposals for international investigation of the BW charges; and what actual U.S. BW policies and capabilities were at the time.

Denials by U.S. Government Officials

There apparently was no official U.S. response to the first North Korean allegation in May 1951. The United States did, however, issue denials within days of the North Korean and Chinese charges at the end of February 1952. The first denial was made by the U.S. Far

East Command in Tokyo, on February 27, 1952.¹³ On March 4, 1952, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated “categorically and unequivocally that these charges are entirely false; the UN forces have not used, are not using, any sort of bacteriological warfare.”¹⁴ Secretary Acheson repeated his denial on March 11 and March 26, 1952. General Matthew Ridgeway, Commander of the UN military forces in Korea, also denied the charges in mid-March, adding, “These charges are evidently designed to conceal the Communists’ inability to cope with the spread of epidemics which occur annually throughout China and North Korea and to care properly for the many victims.”¹⁵ In an address to the U.S. Congress on May 22, 1952, Ridgeway stated that “no element of the United Nations Command has employed either germ or gas warfare in any form at any time.”¹⁶

These denials were repeated in various statements by members of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations from April to June 1952. There was also a denial by the U.S. Secretary of Defense before July 1, 1952. On March 14, 1953 — after the Soviet representative to the UN introduced the bacterial warfare charges into the work of the UN Disarmament Commission — U.S. delegate Benjamin Cohen repeated the American denials.¹⁷ When the Soviet delegation distributed the “confessions” of captured U.S. pilots in the UN General Assembly’s First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, submitted a denial on March 25, 1953, seconded by the commanding officers of the Marine Air Wings to which the pilots had

belonged.¹⁸ On behalf of the United Nations, Secretary General Trygve Lie also denied the allegations.¹⁹

Proposals for International Investigation of the BW Charges

The U.S. government immediately requested, in the United Nations, an on-site investigation by a competent international organization. In his first statement on March 4, 1952, Acheson asked the accusing nations to permit an investigation by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and a week later, Acheson request the ICRC to conduct an investigation.²⁰ Within 24 hours, the ICRC applied to China and North Korea to request their cooperation. The government of India offered to assist. The ICRC proposed to send a small team composed of three Swiss members, two Indians, and a Pakistani. The ICRC sent the same request again on March 28 and on March 31. The last time, on April 10, it stated that if it received no reply by April 20, it would consider its proposal rejected, and having received no direct reply from China or North Korea, on April 30 the ICRC terminated its effort.²¹ The only reply in a UN forum came on March 26, when the Soviet delegate rejected the ICRC offer. China did respond indirectly: in *New China News Agency* broadcasts in March and April, it called the ICRC “a most vicious and shameless accomplice and lackey of American imperialism.”²²

On three occasions during March 1952, UN Secretary General Trygve Lie transmitted an offer by the World Health Organization to assist North Korea and China to control disease

epidemics in North Korea. After a month without replying, China and North Korea rejected the offer. By April 1952, several UN member states urged the United States to ask the UN to conduct its own investigation, and also to bring the issue to the UN Security Council, which the United States did in June–July 1952. In 1952, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru privately suggested to China that it accept an impartial investigation of its BW charges against the United States, but China did not reply. China claimed that the only purpose of an ICRC or WHO investigation would be the collection of intelligence to evaluate the effectiveness of germ warfare.²³

In July 1952, the United States took the issue of an ICRC investigation to the UN Security Council. It submitted a draft resolution calling for the ICRC to carry out an investigation and to report to the UN. The Security Council vote was ten in favor but the Soviet Union vetoed it.²⁴ The United States then submitted a second draft resolution which proposed that “the Security Council would conclude from the refusal of the governments and authorities making the charges to permit impartial investigation that these charges must be presumed to be without substance and false; and would condemn the practice of fabricating and disseminating such false charges.” The vote was nine in favor, one abstention, but the resolution again fell to a Soviet veto. During extensive debate in the UN General Assembly and in the UN Disarmament Commissions in 1952 and 1953, various governments offered their opinions.²⁵ Throughout these debates, the USSR kept pressing the point that the

United States had never ratified the Geneva Protocol—which prohibits the use of biological weapons—and repeatedly called on the United States to do so (the United States did not, however, ratify it until 1975).

The United States made one last attempt at the UN to obtain an investigation. On April 8, 1953, the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly approved a U.S. proposal to institute a commission of investigation. On April 23, the UN General Assembly accepted the U.S. proposal by a vote of 51 for, 5 against, and 4 abstaining. Representatives to the commission from Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, Sweden, and Uruguay were proposed, and all reported their willingness to serve. However, due to the refusal of assistance from the PRC and North Korea, on July 28 the president of the UN General Assembly reported that the commission was unable to accomplish its task.

U.S. BW Policies and Capabilities at the Time of the Korean War

U.S. policy on BW use had been promulgated in NSC 62 on February 1, 1950, months before the Korean War began. It stated that “chemical, biological and radiological weapons will not be used by the United States except in retaliation.”²⁶ This policy remained in force throughout the Korean War and was confirmed, word for word, in NSC 147, on April 2, 1953, which stated that it “appl[ied] to U.N. operations, 1952–1953.”²⁷ These national policy determinations were, however, not publicly disclosed. The policy was not changed until March 15, 1956, when NSC 5062/1 permitted first use of chemical or biological

weapons by U.S. military forces, but only with presidential approval.

Evidence that there was no violation of these NSC policies during the Korean War includes President Harry Truman's reply to a letter by Congressman Robert Kastenmeier dated July 25, 1969: "I wish to state categorically that I did not amend any Presidential order in force regarding biological weapons nor did I at any time give my approval to its use."²⁸

Supporting this conclusion is an affidavit that Brigadier General H. Hillyard, Secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided as evidence during a trial in April 1959, stating that "after a diligent search no record or entry has been found to exist in the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which discloses that the President or any authority superior to the Secretary of Defense, acting at the discretion of the President, did therein at any time, either expressly or impliedly direct, authorize, consent to, or permit any Armed Force, or any element thereof, to use or employ any form of toxic chemical warfare or biological warfare during the period above stated."²⁹

The historical record clearly shows that after 1945, the United States neither produced nor procured any biological munitions until the end of 1951. Then, the United States produced wheat rust, an anti-plant agent meant for use against the wheat crops of the USSR.³⁰ It cannot produce any human disease, and neither China nor North Korea ever alleged that the United States had dispersed this agent. The second BW agent that the United States produced was a human pathogen, but it was not ready until the end of 1954, long after the

Korean War was over. It was for the organism *Brucella suis*, which produces the incapacitating disease Brucellosis, but Brucellosis was not one of the diseases that China or North Korea ever charged the United States with spreading.³¹

Assessment of the BW Allegations

The allegations do not stand up, scientifically or historically. First, historical documentation clearly demonstrates that all of the diseases that the Chinese and North Koreans alleged were introduced by the United States, including smallpox, were endemic to the area at the time. During the Korean War, units of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) and the Korean People's Army (KPA) routinely suffered from typhus, cholera, and dysentery. En route to North Korea, the CPV forces had transited Manchuria, an area in which plague had been endemic for many preceding centuries. United Nations forces, as well as North Korean and Chinese combatants, also suffered from the viral disease Korean Hemorrhagic Fever. In the late winter of 1950 and the early spring of 1951, smallpox and typhus were reported throughout Korea, both north and south.

The UN command responded with mass inoculations and heavy applications of DDT to individuals, and DDT aerial spraying to the countryside at large. The United Nations carried out a massive public health and vaccination program during the Korean War. Eighteen million people were vaccinated against typhoid fever, 16 million against typhus, 15 million against smallpox, and 2 million against cholera. Mortality in the south due to

these diseases was 15,000–30,000 per month (around 270,000 per year) before the vaccination campaign; after the vaccination campaign, it fell to just 40–70 per month (660 per year).³²

In the north, thousands of Chinese healthcare workers were dispatched to the area behind the front lines, and Hungarian and East German volunteer hospital units also went to North Korea to handle the outbreaks. Soviet anti-epidemic teams had been working in Manchuria and North Korea from 1946 on, and a prominent Soviet anti-plague expert was stationed in North Korea prior to the outbreak of the Korean War.³³

In photographs presented as evidence by Chinese authorities, some bacteria were erroneously identified while others were simply harmless, and none could be carried by insects, according to Dr. Rene Dubos, an eminent U.S. bacteriologist who had participated in the U.S. BW program during World War II.³⁴ Dr. C.H. Curran, the Chief Entomologist at the American Museum of Natural History, concurred.³⁵ It was also the wrong season for anyone to attempt insect-borne BW: it was winter in the area. The reports stated that insects were found on snow, but there they would simply freeze and die. Dr. Wu Lien-teh, probably the most eminent Chinese plague expert of the time, labeled the BW allegations a “long string of unfounded accusations,” and attributed the named disease outbreaks in North Korea and China to wartime conditions and deficient public health conditions.³⁶

The assessment of three Canadian scientists was presented by a Canadian UN delegate

during the mid-1952 UN General Assembly debate. They discounted the evidentiary value of the “anomalies” claimed by the Chinese, and attributed the entomological “novel discoveries” to a massive and probably unprecedented collection effort.³⁷ The UN representative from New Zealand presented the summation of an assessment by the President of the New Zealand Association of Scientific Workers, which disparaged the various allegations and the reports containing them. This was particularly noteworthy, as its parent association, the International Association of Scientific Workers, was a recognized Soviet front organization. The New Zealand delegate concluded that there was no indication that Needham’s group had ever found any physical evidence in the places where bacterial weapons were said to have been used.³⁸ The Australian delegate presented the conclusion of a group of Australian scientists headed by Sir MacFarlane Burnett, who concluded that BW had never been used by UN forces in Korea.³⁹

New research methodologies have recently helped disprove one of the Chinese allegations. In disclosures publicized in 1988, China had claimed to have “documented” four cases of anthrax it attributed to U.S. air drops. In 1990, however, a conference paper on anthrax by a Chinese scientist stated that industrial anthrax infections due to contaminated wool in Chinese knitting factories were routine.⁴⁰ Moreover, in 2002, analysis was carried out under U.S.-Chinese collaboration in the United States of some 200 samples of *B. anthracis* isolates from Chinese culture collections; it found all to be indigenous Chinese strains,

even those identified by the Chinese as being from the alleged U.S. anthrax attacks.⁴¹

A second reason to be skeptical of the allegations is that the two international commission reports have very little scientific credibility. Neither the Lawyers' Commission nor the ISC did any field investigations or analyses: both accepted as fact the evidence presented to them by Chinese government field staff, without any independent corroboration. Even the Commission members conceded as much. For example, the Swedish representative on the Commission reportedly said that, "the delegates implicitly believed the Chinese and North Korean accusations and evidence." The ISC chair, Dr. Needham, was asked what proof he had that the samples of plague bacillus he was shown actually came, as the Chinese said, from an unusual swarm of voles; he reportedly replied, "None. We accepted the word of the Chinese scientists. It is possible to maintain that the whole thing was a kind of patriotic conspiracy [but] I prefer to believe the Chinese were not acting parts."⁴²

Neither China nor North Korea ever claimed to have shot down a U.S. aircraft containing the means of delivery for biological agents or any agents themselves, even though the Chinese claimed, for example, that a total of 955 sorties to drop BW over Northeast China were undertaken by 175 groups of U.S. aircraft between February 29 and March 31 1952. Similarly, the Chinese claimed that the United States had spread BW over "70 cities and counties of Korea ... on 804 occasions."⁴³ The Chinese obtained "confessions" of some 25 captured U.S. pilots which offered voluminous detail about the kinds of bombs and other

containers allegedly dropped, the types of insects, the diseases they carried, and so forth, along with a great deal of communist rhetoric familiar from Chinese press reports with references to “imperialists” and “capitalistic Wall Street war mongers.” The combination of rhetoric and excessive technical detail led nearly all objective observers to conclude that none of the “confessions” had been written by the pilots themselves. Not surprisingly, then, all of the confessions were renounced when the U.S. airmen returned to the United States. The Chinese authorities also touted supposed confessions from captured U.S. ground troops “admitting” that they had delivered BW in Korea by artillery—“epidemic germ shells”—a type of armament the United States did not have either then or for many years afterwards.⁴⁴

Remarks to U.S. State Department officials by General Hoyt Vandenberg, then chief of the U.S. Air Force, responded to a Chinese allegation that U.S. aircraft had dropped insects over the city of Tsingtao. General Vandenberg stated that U.S. aircraft had no authority to fly over the area in question, that no such flights had been authorized, and that no U.S. planes flew over Tsingtao on reconnaissance.⁴⁵

During the Korean War, Tibor Meray, a Hungarian war correspondent, had accepted the biological warfare charges, and wrote about them in dispatches and in books, but he later described his doubts on the “evidence” that had been provided to him in Korea. He stated that local staff at a Hungarian rural hospital in North Korea said that Chinese soldiers had

emplaced the “germ sachets”; they had not been dropped by U.S. airplanes.⁴⁶ He also recounted conversations in 1956 with “various Communists, Poles, Yugoslavs ... who have recently spent some time in China [and who] have informed me that *some Chinese leaders* in the course of friendly conversations stated that they *considered the whole Korean war to have been a mistake* into which they had been pushed by Stalin. *And that they believed the accusations about germ warfare to have been without foundation.*”⁴⁷

A third and overwhelmingly compelling reason to discount the allegations is that Soviet documents of the period described them as “fictitious.” In the months following the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, Nikita Khrushchev and Lavrenti Beria struggled for power. In the 1990s, Cold War historians would learn how the battle was fought in the Central Committee on proxy grounds over several substantive issues such as “the Doctors plot” and Beria’s notions for future Soviet policies toward Germany. In 1998 a third such issue was revealed to be the Korean War BW allegations against the United States.

In January 1998, a dozen documents became available from former Soviet archives that provided explicit and detailed evidence on the Korean War BW charges.⁴⁸ The documents shed light on how the BW allegations were deliberately contrived — at least in part — by Chinese officials and Soviet advisors, and they identify several of the individuals involved in the process.⁴⁹ They reveal a number of telling details. For example, Soviet military advisors, together with North Korean personnel, created “false areas of exposure” prior to

the arrival of the ISC members, using cholera bacteria obtained from corpses in China.

“Sites of infection” were also created before the Lawyer’s Commission arrived. Soviet advisors created “false plague regions,” in which corpses were arranged and cholera and plague bacterial samples were supplied for the ISC investigation. To hurry the ISC out of viewing areas, Soviet advisors and North Korean personnel set off explosions close to them.

The documents reveal that the Soviet advisor “aided” in composing the initial 1951 North Korean accusation that the United States was spreading smallpox, because the North Koreans felt the BW allegations were needed to discredit the Americans. The same Soviet advisors reported in March 1952 to General Shtemenko, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, and to the Soviet General Staff, that there had been no outbreaks of plague and cholera in China and no examples of bacteriological weapons, and stated that if any were found, they would be sent to Moscow immediately. Soviet advisors informed Kim Il Sung that they had been unable to confirm any use of BW, and that they had disproved the Chinese charges that the United States was using poison gas. In addition, “[on] 22 February 1952, the DPRK received an intentionally false statement from the Chinese about the use of bacteriological weapons by the Americans.”

Finally, the documents reveal, on April 21, 1953, Foreign Minister Molotov directed the Soviet ambassador at the UN to reduce his emphasis on the accusations. A Soviet cable to

Mao of May 2, 1953, is particularly striking. It charges that: “The Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the CPSU were misled. The spread in the press of information about the use by the Americans of bacteriological weapons in Korea was based on false information. The accusations against the Americans were fictitious.” The message recommended that the international anti-American campaign on the subject be dropped immediately.

It is possible that other Soviet documentation on the Korean War allegations might establish exactly whose idea the false allegations were—whether the USSR’s or China’s—and provide a more detailed understanding of the nature and degree of the technical assistance that Soviet advisers contributed. The available documents imply first a Chinese and then a North Korean initiative, with Soviet personnel as collaborators. After the appearance of the Lawyers’ Commission reports in early April 1952, the United States learned that Soviet representatives in North Korea had “reprimanded the North Koreans and Chinese for failing to produce a better propaganda case on bacteriological warfare.”⁵⁰

It is conceivable that there were different Soviet and Chinese bureaucratic initiatives at different times, with the Chinese taking greater responsibility after the initial 1951 events. These remain open questions until it is possible to understand more about the operations of the USSR Ministry of State Security at the time, its collaboration with analogous Chinese government organs, their elaboration of “active measures,” and so forth. A clear chain in

the allegations preceded the start of the Korean War, which included the release of BW-related disinformation concerning U.S. activities in the North Pacific region that charged that the United States was preparing to use BW, employing scientists who were major figures in the Japanese BW program, preparing relevant BW facilities in Japan, and producing biological weapons there for use in Korea.⁵¹ Such pre-war charges would have been produced by the disinformation sections within the Soviet and Chinese intelligence agencies. However, the decision to charge the United States with using BW could only have been made in the context of the war. The unanswered question is the degree of consultation and cooperation between the USSR and China about propaganda in the period not covered by the documents.

Jung Chang and Jon Halliday assert that China was responsible for the false charges, arguing that “Mao used the issue to whip up hatred for the United States inside China.”⁵² When the brusque May 2, 1953, cable reached Mao, accusing China of misleading the Soviet leadership, “Mao was clearly taken aback, [and] he gave orders to end the war that very night.”⁵³

Western Speculation about Reasons Why the Korean War BW Allegations Were Made

It is notable that the Soviet documents confirm a simple explanation of the motivation of at least one of the accusing parties: the North Koreans intended to discredit the Americans

with the allegations. For decades, the simplest explanation has always seemed the most sensible: that the BW allegations were part of the Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean war effort, meant to discredit the United States and to weaken international support for the UN intervention to reverse North Korea's invasion of South Korea. However, a long list of more disparate, complicated, and often contradictory reasons were suggested by senior U.S. government officials and academics over a period spanning 50 years. These include: to blame the United States for naturally occurring disease epidemics in North Korea and China during the war;⁵⁴ to provide tactical advantage for China and North Korea in the truce negotiations;⁵⁵ as propaganda to assist the World Peace Council, a Soviet front organization, in its annual mobilization campaign;⁵⁶ as Soviet anti-U.S. propaganda, with both domestic and international goals, "intended to confuse, to divide, to paralyze ... [and] to isolate the free world from the United States";⁵⁷ to prepare the ground for Soviet use of BW against U.S. or allied forces in Korea;⁵⁸ as a proxy campaign to deter the United States from using nuclear weapons in the Korean War;⁵⁹ to prop up public support within China for the continuing war,⁶⁰ as a preventive public health measure, to facilitate mass public-health mobilization campaigns in China; or a combination of several of these reasons.⁶¹

Lessons of the Case

The United States did not do as much as it could have to uncover and confirm relevant

facts. U.S. intelligence agencies did try to identify who was responsible for carrying out the planting of evidence in the field in China.⁶²

The CIA produced a Special Estimate in March 1952 titled "Communist Charges of US Use of Biological Warfare." It is remarkably bland and, perhaps due to its early provenance, contains far less information than is provided in the pages of this chapter. The one significant piece of information that it contained was:

...that the Chinese Communist Government may have established a small basic and applied laboratory BW research program. This program is probably carried out in three scientific institutes located in North China and Manchuria.... The Chinese BW program, intimately related to the CW program, is reported to be closely supervised and supported by the USSR. Non-Chinese are prominent in the research program. Soviet personnel participate as directors of the principal laboratories, and as many as 50 percent of the scientists and technicians are reportedly Soviet. In addition, 120 Japanese specialists from the Former Kwantung Army BW units have been integrated into the program by the Chinese Communists.⁶³

No further information is available regarding the activities of the Soviet, Chinese and Japanese personnel. Whether they played any role in depositing the biological materials in the field that the Chinese used as the basis for the allegations is unknown.

The Soviet documents that became available in 1998 do explain the role of Soviet military representatives in North Korea in concocting and placing false “evidence” in North Korea. The political culture of each of the three accusing countries—the USSR, China, and North Korea—was built on false and fabricated information, often elaborate, directed both to its own domestic public and to the international community. Chinese and North Korean officials sometimes claim, even now, that the United States used BW during the Korean War.⁶⁴ Current Chinese military historians who still think the Korean BW charges are correct apparently do so on the basis of the two internal Chinese military documents quoted earlier, not on the basis of the “evidence” of the insects, spiders, clams, and so on that the Chinese gave to the Needham Commission.⁶⁵

The U.S. government missed one significant opportunity to diffuse the Soviet propaganda campaign: in pressing their charges in the UN debates, Soviet diplomats repeatedly pointed out that the United States was not a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In 1943, however, President Roosevelt had declared that the United States would abide by the provisions of the Geneva Protocol and would not use chemical or biological weapons (CBW) except in retaliation. Under NSC 68, this remained official U.S. policy throughout the Korean War. However, U.S. government officials and diplomats never reiterated the 1943 U.S. statement nor publicly stated U.S. BW policy at any time during the Korean War.⁶⁶ On the contrary, Ambassadors Gross and Cohen described the Protocol as

“obsolete” and “a paper promise,” and pointed out that the USSR’s own signature to the “no first use” provision of the Protocol was functionally nullified by its charges of U.S. use. Moreover, China and North Korea were not signatories either.

It is clear that some individuals in the U.S. government considered how to rebut the BW allegations, but they were all at low levels in various departments. None held a position of authority sufficient to mandate any particular course of action, and there is no available record of consideration of a meaningful analytical response by senior level officials. Their ideas varied widely in their potential utility. Some of the suggestions skirted close to what should have been done, while the purpose of others was purely rhetorical or symbolic.

Among the suggestions were to ask the UN Secretary-General to secretly dispatch Swedish or Indian medical officers, then serving with their national units in South Korea, to ascertain that UN forces had no chemical munitions. Another suggestion was to investigate the possibility of filing an international libel action against the Soviet Union in the World Court or the UN.⁶⁷

The first analysis within the US government regarding the BW accusations was a Special Estimate prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency on March 27, 1952, quite soon after the 1952 accusations were made. It was a brief, 7-page document divided into four sections: “Facts Bearing on the Problem,” “Possible Purposes of the Campaign,” and two appendices, “Disease in the Korean Area” and “Communist BW Capabilities in the Korean

Area.”⁶⁸ A draft prepared seven days earlier, on March 18, included a third, longer appendix titled “The Propaganda Campaign.” There is virtually nothing notable in the document except the report of astonishingly high mortality rates among North Korean and Chinese combat forces during the preceding year’s – 1951 – epidemics, between 30 and 60 percent of those infected in the typhus, typhoid and smallpox epidemics.⁶⁹

By July 1, 1952, a special interdepartmental committee was established with the purpose of devising ways and means of refuting the BW allegations. As part of this effort, the Office of Public Information (OPI) in the Department of Defense compiled a package entitled “The Truth About BW” with copies of official letters, messages, and speeches by U.S. officials as well as officials of other governments, scientific opinions, press comments, and other background material. It was meant to be used as an official source by U.S. government officials for rebutting the Communist propaganda charges.⁷⁰

In September 1952 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill requested the opinion of his WWII scientific adviser, Lord Cherwell, on the BW allegations. Cherwell's reply demolished the charges. He noted the simplicity of faking "evidence," but in regard to the Communist BW allegations he wrote "No normal mind would consider such suspect pieces of evidence as valid proof...these things are nonsense from a scientific point of view.... It is strange that the Communist propagandists should be so stupid as to allow allegations of this sort to be put forward when any competent biologist must know they are rubbish. It

shows either that they are extremely ignorant or extremely careless in faking their evidence..."⁷¹ But Cherwell did not suggest that the British government produce a public report explaining precisely what he told Churchill.

On September 17, 1952, the Department of State had decided to "concentrate on demonstrating that [the Needham Commission] is not an impartial commission" and to "try to find a basis for shooting holes in 'scientific findings'." Then, it would again seek "to create a genuinely impartial commission to investigate the BW charges."⁷² Others, however, wondered "whether or not we do ourselves more harm than good by raising the issue and debating it extensively."⁷³ As late as March 1953, Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. ambassador to the UN, sought assistance from the White House in rebutting the BW charges.⁷⁴ One response was a proposal for creation of "an American Committee of 100 Against Soviet Germ Warfare Lies," which would request that the U.S. government "assist it in the scientific research necessary to refute the charges [and] expose the lies."⁷⁵

This was much too late, and too diffuse, and by March and April 1953, the issue had died down. The only operational U.S. responses to the allegations were its blanket denials and requests for ICRC, WHO, and UN investigations. The U.S. government's initial response was the appropriate one: it requested an immediate investigation by an international agency, the International Red Cross. However, after that effort failed almost immediately, the United States did nothing for a full year. A second response was an offer from General

Weyland, the commander of the US Far East Air Forces (FEAF) to permit Ambassador Lodge to reveal that FEAF had no biological warfare capability, though Weyland was not happy to do so.⁷⁶ Then, in the spring of 1953, it requested the UN investigation, which it must have expected would be rejected by China and North Korea. The United States government made no effort to produce a serious scientific analysis of the charges.

Although such an effort would obviously have been hampered by lack of on-site access, it could have been useful.

A number of measures could have improved the process of identification, characterization, and attribution. An international investigatory group of eminent microbiologists, entomologists, and epidemiologists should have been convened. Pre-1949 data on the incidence of the diseases in question in China and North Korea could have been compiled, as could data for South Korea before and after immunization campaigns. Public health data for Korea during the decades of Japanese occupation might have been available.

Information on the insects, their geographical distributions and life cycles—particularly in South Korea—and their relations to specific pathogens could have been assembled and analyzed. Entomological and microbiological field sampling could have been carried out in South Korea. The report could also have articulated the standards and methodology proper to such an investigation. Even with limitations, all UN member states could have been given a scientific rebuttal of the charges. Although this would not have resolved the issue

in an absolute sense, it would have meant that the Needham/ISC report was not left without a serious analytical rebuttal. However, no other quasi-governmental or non-governmental Western group ever investigated the Korean War BW allegations.

It is unquestionable that Soviet-bloc Cold War practices led to the false attributions of BW use during the “hot” Korean War. Because they were fabrications, there was no possibility that China or North Korea would allow an impartial expert investigation by the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or any ad hoc group. The only other thing that could have been done, either under state sponsorship or by an independent scientific coalition of some sort, would have been an academic analytic exercise without recourse to field samples. These lessons of the Korean War case may well be needed in the future, if opponents seek once again to discredit one another in the international arena with fabricated allegations of BW use.

Endnotes

¹ Portions of this chapter are adapted from Milton Leitenberg, “New Russian Evidence on the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations: Background and Analysis,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 1 (Winter 1998):185–200; and Milton Leitenberg, “Resolution of the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations,” *Critical Reviews in Microbiology* 24, no. 3 (Fall 1998):169–194.

² UN Security Council 1951, S/2142/Rev 1: Cablegram dated 8 May 1951 addressed to the President of the Security Council from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, United Nations Security Council: Official Records, Supplement for 1 April through 30 June 1951.

³ Statement by North Korean Foreign Minister Bak Hun Yung to the UN Secretariat, in Anonymous, “Stop U.S. Germ Warfare!” (Beijing: Chinese People's Committee for World Peace, n.d. [probably 1952]). On the day before, the New China News Agency (NCNA) broadcast the charge of BW attacks between January 28 and February 17, 1952 against North Korea. Central Intelligence Agency, Board of National Estimates, “Memorandum for the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Subject” SE-24, Communist Charges of US Use of Biological Weapons,” March 18, 1952.

⁴ Zhou Enlai statements of February 24, 1952, and March 8, 1952, in Anonymous, “Stop

U.S. Germ Warfare!” Once again, NCNA broadcast the charges two days earlier. Central Intelligence Agency, Board of National Estimates, “Memorandum for the Intelligence Advisory Committee.”

⁵ “Report on American Invaders Using Bacteria Weapons and Our Responsive Actions,” February 28, 1952, *Selected Military Works of Nie Rongzhen* (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, n.d.).

⁶ “Comments on Nie Rongzhen’s Report about Large-scale Airdropping of Insects Carrying Bacteria by Enemy in the Korean Battlefield, February 19, 1952,” in *Anthology of Mao Zedong Since 1949*, vol. 3: *January 1952–December 1952* (Beijing: The Central Documents Publishing House, 1989).

⁷ UN Security Council, “Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, President of the Security Council, Dated June 30, 1952; Annexes 1, II and III, International Association of Democratic Lawyers,” S/2684/Add.1, June 30, 1952 (hereafter “USSR letter of June 30, 1952”).

⁸ Ernest A. Gross, “Security Council Statement of July 1, 1952,” *Department of State Bulletin*, July 28, 1952, pp. 153–159. The most useful source for reference to original UN and U.S. documents dealing with the Korean War BW allegations are the endnotes in John Ellis Van Courtland Moon, “Biological Warfare Allegations: The Korean War Case,” in

R.A. Zilinskas, ed., *The Microbiologist and Biological Defense Research, Annual of the New York Academy of Sciences*, no. 666 (1992), pp. 53–83.

⁹ USSR letter of June 30, 1952.

¹⁰ “Chinese Commission for Investigation of the American Crime of Germ Warfare,” New China News Agency (NCNA), April 7, 1952.

¹¹ *People’s China*, April 16, 1952, supplement.

¹² Indeed, Mao told members of Needham’s commission, “Don’t make too much of all this! They have tried using biochemical warfare, but it hasn’t been too successful. What are all these uninfected insects they are dropping”? Jon Halliday and Bruce Cummings, *Korea: The Unknown War* (New York: Pantheon, 1988), p. 185.

¹³ A.M. Halpern, *Bacteriological Warfare Accusations in Two Asian Communist Propaganda Campaigns*, RAND RM-796 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 25 Apr 1952), pp. 6–7.

¹⁴ Dean Acheson, *Department of State Bulletin* 26:664 (1952), 427–428.

¹⁵ Matthew B. Ridgeway, “Report of the U.N. Command Operation in Korea: Forty-first Report. For the Period Mar. 1–15. 1952,” *Department of State Bulletin* 26, no. 679 (1952): 1040. See also General Matthew B. Ridgeway, “A Report on the Far East,” *Department of*

State Bulletin 26, no. 676 (1952): 926.

¹⁶ See Halpern, *Bacteriological Warfare Accusations*, pp. 6–7.

¹⁷ Benjamin V. Cohen, “U.S. Position on Germ Warfare, Statement on May 27, 1952 to the UN Disarmament Commission,” *Department of State Bulletin* (June 9, 1952): 911–963.

¹⁸ See Halpern, *Bacteriological Warfare Accusations*, pp. 6–7.

¹⁹ UN Security Council Official Records, Seventh Year, 590th meeting, and UN Document 5/2688.

²⁰ La Comité Internationale de la Croix-Rouge, *La Comité International de la Croix Rouge and le Conflit de Corée, Recueil de Documents*, vol. II, January 1–June 20, 1952 (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952). The ICRC had experience in this area: during World War II, China had appealed to the ICRC to investigate its charges that Japan was employing BW in China. In 1952, the Red Cross societies of virtually all the Soviet-bloc states had sent direct appeals to the ICRC asking it to “take action against the U.S. atrocities” in Korea.

²¹ La Comité Internationale de la Croix-Rouge, *La Comité International de la Croix Rouge and le Conflit de Corée*, pp. 84–109.

²² Quoted in Moon, “Biological Warfare Allegations,” p. 69.

²³ Anonymous, “Stop U.S. Germ Warfare!”

²⁴ UN Security Council Official Records, Seventh Year, 590th Meeting, and UN Document S/2688.

²⁵ The discussions in the General Assembly in this phase of the dispute are summarized in Jozef Goldblat, “Allegations of the Use of Bacteriological and Chemical Weapons in Korea and China,” *CB Disarmament Negotiations 1920–1970* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971): 216–218.

²⁶ “NSC 62: Chemical Warfare Policy,” A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense, February 1, 1950, Record Group 273, U.S. National Archives.

²⁷ “NSC 147: Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea,” December 28, 1953.

²⁸ Copy of President Truman’s letter, July 25, 1969, supplied to the author by Representative Robert Kastenmeier in 1969.

²⁹ Certificate, Brigadier General H.L. Hillyard, U.S. Army, Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 21, 1959, CCS 3260: Chemical, Biological etc.: 1959, RG 218: Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Central Decimal File, Box 032, National Archives of the United States. This information was kindly supplied by the historian John van Courtland Moon, in a personal communication in 1998.

³⁰ Eileen R. Choffnes, “Germs on the Loose,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 57 no. 2 (March–April 2001): 57–61. During the years 1951 to 1954, a small group of planners in the Air Force Operations Atomic (AFOAT) unit at US Air Force headquarters in Washington kept optimistically pushing for a US Air Force BW capability, only to be repeatedly blocked not only at the policy level but also by the delays in US BW development. For a very useful guide to available declassified papers, see Conrad C. Crane, “‘No Practical Capabilities’: American biological and chemical warfare programs during the Korean war,” *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine*, 45:2 (Spring 2002): 241-249.

³¹ United States Department of the Army, *U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological Warfare Program*, vol. II, February 24, 1977.

³² Gross, “Security Council Statement of July 1, 1952,” p. 157.

³³ Information provided by U.S. CIA in 1999, and corroborated by a Russian plague expert in 2002 (personal communications).

³⁴ A.M. Rosenthal, “Reds’ Photographs on Germ Warfare Exposed as Fakes,” *New York Times*, April 3, 1952.

³⁵ Rosenthal, “Reds’ Photographs on Germ Warfare Exposed as Fakes.”

³⁶ Dr. Wu Lien-teh, writing in the *Hong Kong Standard*, quoted in Henry R. Lieberman, “Chinese Scientist Scouts Germ Use: Plague Authority Says Enemy Charge Reflects No Credit on Red Army Doctors,” *New York Times*, April 7, 1952. This reference was kindly supplied by Dr. Martin Furmanski.

³⁷ UN Document, A/C. 1/SR. 591.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Shu Lin Dong, “Progress in the Control and Research of Anthrax in China,” *Salisbury Medical Bulletin, Special Supplement: Proceedings of the International Workshop on Anthrax*, no. 68 (January 1990): 104–105.

⁴¹ Martin Hugh Jones, personal communication, 2002. Dr. Jones, Department of Veterinary Medicine, Louisiana State University, is one of the most prominent experts in anthrax and maintains one of the largest reference collections of anthrax cultures in the world.

⁴² G.P. Thompson, “Germ Warfare,” *New Statesman and Nation* (December 5, 1953).

⁴³ Anonymous, “Stop U.S. Germ Warfare!”

⁴⁴ David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1964), pp. 355–357, 360–363.

⁴⁵ General Hoyt Vandenberg, cited in *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1952–54, March 19, 1952, p. 101.

⁴⁶ Tibor Meray, “The Truth about Germ Warfare,” *Franc-Tireur*, May 6–19, 1957. This series of twelve articles published in the Parisian daily was translated into English in 1999. See in particular pp. 25, 26, 27, 28, 51 and 52 of Meray’s unpublished English-language translation (copy in my possession).

⁴⁷ Meray, “The Truth about Germ Warfare” (emphasis added). According to an informant, a former senior Chinese diplomat said, “It was all bullshit.” Personal communication, December 14, 1995.

⁴⁸ The documents were not released through official channels, but since the documents reached the West, they have been authenticated through multiple independent contacts with Russian authorities (some of whom served at the time of the Korean War, and others in the Russian government in the 1990s). One fragmentary document is dated February 21, 1952; the remaining eleven date from April 13 to June 2, 1953, in the four months following Stalin’s death. The documents consist of reports to the Soviet Central Committee from members of the Soviet military mission in North Korea; messages to the Soviet

ambassadors in North Korea and China directing them to transmit messages to Kim Il Sung and to Mao Zedong; the substance of those messages; and replies to Moscow by the same Soviet ambassadors. Translations of the twelve documents were published and described in detail in Leitenberg, “New Russian Evidence on the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations: Background and Analysis”; and Leitenberg, “Resolution of the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations.”

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Research, “Communist Bacteriological Warfare Propaganda,” Special Paper 4, Washington, D.C.: June 16, 1952, p. 16.

⁵¹ Details are provided in Leitenberg, “New Russian Evidence on the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations”; and Leitenberg, “Resolution of the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations.”

⁵² Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story* (London: Vintage, 2006), Chapter 34, “Why Mao and Stalin Started the Korean War,” pp. 371–395. In interviews with Chang and Halliday, Russian Generals Valentin Zozinov and Igor Selivanov denied that any biological warfare occurred in Korea, and Colonel Karpov of the Russian FSB confirmed the authenticity of the documents.

⁵³ Chang and Halliday, *Mao*, p. 393.

⁵⁴ Acheson, Department of State Bulletin 26:664 (1952); and Matthew B. Ridgeway, “Report of the U.N. Command Operation in Korea. Forty-First Report.”

⁵⁵ Halpern, *Bacteriological Warfare Accusations in Two Asian Communist Propaganda Campaigns*.

⁵⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Communist Bacteriological Warfare Propaganda*, OIR/CPI Special Paper no. 4, 16 (June 1952), unclassified.

⁵⁷ Statements by Ernest A. Gross, “Need for Elimination of Germ Warfare,” to the UN Security Council, June 18, 1952; and Gross, “Request for Impartial Investigation,” to the UN Security Council, June 20, 1952, *Department of State Bulletin* (July 7, 1952): 32–37; statement by Ernest A. Gross, “The Soviet Germ Warfare Campaign: The Strategy of the Big Lie,” to the UN Security Council, June 20, 1952; and Gross, Security Council Statement of July 3, 1952, *Department of State Bulletin* (July 28, 1952): 153–159.

⁵⁸ Statement by Benjamin V. Cohen, “U.S. Position on Germ Warfare”; Statement by Ernest A. Gross, “Need for Elimination of Germ Warfare.” Under-Secretary of State Robert Lovett also considered this to be a likely reason, as did General Mark Clark while serving in Korea.

⁵⁹Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 1957): 376; Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1962): 4; Mark A. Ryan, "Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Allegations of Chemical Biological Warfare," *Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the United States During the Korean War* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1989): 104–138.

⁶⁰William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

⁶¹David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1964); Albert E. Cowdry, "'Germ Warfare' and Public Health in the Korean Conflict," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 39 (April 1984): 153–172; Conrad Crane, "Chemical and Biological Warfare During the Korean War: Rhetoric and Reality," *Asian Perspective* 25, No. 3 (2001): 61–83; Ruth Rogaski, "Nature, Annihilation, and Modernity: China's Korean War Germ-Warfare Experience Reconsidered," *Journal of Asian Studies* 61, no. 2 (May 2002): 381–415.

⁶²In early 1999, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency supplied the author with several pages of declassified information.

⁶³Central Intelligence Agency, "Special Estimate: Communist Charges of US Use of

Biological Warfare," SE-24, March 25, 1952. Although labeled "Confidential" and therefore not technically classified, it proved impossible to obtain this document from the CIA since 1988 or to locate a copy in the National Archives. It was only obtained in July 2007 through the special intervention of a former CIA official.

⁶⁴ Milton Leitenberg, "The Korean War Biological Weapon Allegations: Additional Information and Disclosures," *Asian Perspective* 24, no. 3 (2000): 159–172.

⁶⁵ Personal communications, February 22, 1996 and March 18, 1996.

⁶⁶ "Clearer Statement on Germ War Sought," *New York Times*, May 4, 1952; Thomas J. Hamilton, "United States Once Spurred Protocol It Now Fights on Germ War," *New York Times*, June 20, 1952; and Thomas J. Hamilton, "Germ-Warfare Canard Grows to Major Issue: Moscow, Which Spread the Story, May Hear More from the UN Assembly," *New York Times*, July 12, 1952. These references were kindly supplied by Dr. Martin Furmanski.

⁶⁷ Edmund L. Taylor, Assistant Director, Office of Policy and Plans, U.S. Department of State, July 3, 1952.

⁶⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, "Special Estimate: Communist Charges of US Use of Biological Warfare," SE-24, March 25, 1952.

⁶⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, Board of National Estimates, “Memorandum for the Intelligence Advisory Committee.”

⁷⁰ “Report on Chemical and Biological Warfare Readiness,” Office, Director of Administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant for Special Security Programs, July 1, 1952, p. 29.

⁷¹ Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General to Prime Minister, 24 September 1952, PREM 11/250 Communist allegations of US germ warfare in Korea and China: report to Prime Minister 1952.

⁷² Staff Meeting, Psychological Strategy Board, September 17, 1952. Referring to the “still unexplained ... ridiculous nature of the BW charges” and their “insultingly unscientific basis” was a memo from Col. K.K. Hansen, State Department, re: “Evaluation of Communist Bacterial Warfare Charges,” Psychological Strategy Board, May 15, 1952.

⁷³ Charles R. Norberg, Memorandum: “Germ Warfare,” Psychological Strategy Board, October 10, 1952. Apparently many U.S. embassies shared that view. Staff Study, Preliminary Analysis of the Communist BW Propaganda Campaign, (PSB D-25), Psychological Strategy Board, June 3, 1952.

⁷⁴ Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Letter to “C.D.” (C.D. Jackson, White House staff), March 12, 1953.

⁷⁵ C.D. Jackson, Letter to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 21, 1953.

⁷⁶ Crane, “No Practical Capabilities”, 2002, p. 242.